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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-EXEMPT CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION-Plaintiff corporation was organized in 1947 by physicians
who had formerly maintained a clinic for the practice of medicine as a partnership. The articles of incorporation provided that there should be no capital stock
and no dividends, and stated that plaintiff was organized as a non-profit corporation for the purpose of providing medical treatment and hospitalization to sick
and injured persons without regard to ability to pay therefor, and of providing
such other incidental charitable services as the "trustees" of the corporation
should prescribe. Pursuant to its by-laws, plaintiff paid such annual salaries to
its member physicians as the trustees, who were elected by the members, directed.
Plaintiff never maintained a hospital, and its sole charitable service was the
rendering of medical treatment at its clinic to persons unable to pay therefor,
although the vast majority of plaintiff's patients paid fees to the corporation.
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Over plaintiff corporation's objection that it was exempt from taxation under
section 101(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner assessed income
taxes on plaintiff's 1948 net income, which plaintiff paid. In an action to recover'
the tax, held, plaintiff is not exempt from income taxation since it was neither
organized nor operated exclusively for charitable, educational, or scientific purposes, and since at least part of its net earnings inured to the benefit of private
individuals. Fort Scott Clinic and Hospital Corp. v. Brodrick, (D.C. Kan. 1951)
99 F. Supp. 515.
Among the corporations exempted from the federal income tax by section
101 of the Internal Revenue Code are those which are organized and operated
exclusively for charitable and similar purposes, no part of the net income of
which inures to the benefit of any private individual.1 Three requirements are
thus imposed to fall within the exempt category and, although liberally construed,2 their precise application has never been free from doubt. 3 The first prescribed requirement is that the corporation be "organized" exclusively for one
of the statutory purposes, but the meaning of "exclusively" is interpreted as more
nearly approximating "primarily" than "solely."4 Moreover, the articles of incorporation are not controlling, since evidence of collateral contemporaneous
expressions of purpose may be considered.15 Just what objective circumstances
evidence a "charitable" purpose is by no means clear, however: the mere fact
that all net earnings are to be expended for charitable purposes does not insure
exemption; 6 conversely, the fact that the beneficiaries of the charitable services
are to pay for them at least in part, and that the proximate dispensers of the
services are to receive compensation, does not defeat the privilege.7 In addition,
1 " . . . the following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter ••.
(6) Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the activities
of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation..•."
I.R.C., §101(6). See generally Eaton, "Charitable Foundations, Tax Avoidance and Business Expediency," 35 VA. L. REv. 809 and 987 (1949). The form of the organization is
immaterial; ordinary trusts are eligible for the privilege. James Sprunt Benevolent Trust,
20 B.T.A. 19 (1930).
2 Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 55 S.Ct. 17 (1934); Cochran v. Commissioner,
( 4th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 176.
3 See Wolkstein, "Section 101(6)," 28 TAXEs 847 (1950).
4 Latcham, "Private Charitable Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Implications," 98
Umv. PA. L. REv. 617 at 639 (1950). See Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation, 9 T.C.
533 (1947), affd., (6th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 483.
5 Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 776; Wolkstein,
"Section 101(6)," 28 TAXEs 847 (1950).
o United States v. Community Service, Inc., (4th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 421; contra,
C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 120, revg. 14 T.C. 922
(1950).
7Treas. Reg. 111, §29.101(6)-1; Battle Creek, Inc., 1940 P-H B.T.A. Mem. Dec.
1[40,478, affd. (5th Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 405.
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corporations which make payments to private persons out of net eamings8 or
which engage in competitive enterprises9 may be exempt. The second requirement is that the corporation must be "operated" for the purpose stated. Consequently, a corporation organized for an exempt purpose may lose its exemption
by subsequent operations beyond that purpose. 10 However, a subsequently
formed charitable purpose, though acted upon, will not operate to exempt a
corporation. 11 The third requirement, that no part of the net income inure
to the benefit of any private individual, has not limited the courts, contrary
to what seems a clear direction of the statute, to an inquiry into whether there
are dividend-like distributions of "net income" in the accounting sense.
Rather, it appears well established that if the instrumentality is used for the
commercial benefit of any private person, by payment of salary or otherwise, this
statutory condition for exemption is not fulfilled. 12 The end result is that this
portion of the definition blends into the other two. These generalizations, however, while usually set out by the courts, are of little assistance in the decision
of individual cases. It is submitted that a careful reading of the decisions construing the exemption-defining terms of the statute reveals that it is generally
impossible i:o assert that a given set of objective circumstances will result in an
exempt or non-exempt status. In almost all instances in which exemption is
claimed by the organization and denied by the Commissioner, the ultimate
inquiry must be into the subjective motive of the promoters and managers of
the corporation or foundation. 13 Such an approach inevitably leads to the result
that each case must stand on its own facts. The principal case is an excellent
illustration of this method of analysis. In spite of the facts that the articles provided for a clearly charitable corporation, that charitable services were in fact
rendered, and that no attempt to distribute net earnings was made, the court
held that none of the statutory tests were fulfilled. This holding was based on
the court's belief that the organizers viewed their corporation as a useful vehicle
for the profitable practice of medicine rather than as a charitable instrumentality.
As a matter of policy, the subjective test, while lacking in certainty, is probably
the best available if the dual objective of the exemption provisions of the Code,
namely, the insuring of a favored position to all organizations legitimately
8 Edward J. Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation, supra note 4. 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FBD·
BRAL INcoMB TAXATION §34.17 (1949).
9 Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 5; see also, cases cited in note 6
supra. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, etc., 263 U.S. 578, 44 S.Ct. 204 (1924).
10 Although the foundation was held exempt, this was the theory on which the Little
Foundation v. Jones, (D.C. Okla. Dec. 10, 1951) P-H 1952 Tax Service ,172,252, was tried.
11 Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, (2d Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 475.
12 Northern lliinois College of Optometry, 1943 P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. ,143,396. But
compare Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926); Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, (D.C. Ala. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 525; see Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, (5th Cir.
1950) 181 F. (2d) 9.
13 Latcham, "Private Charitable Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Implications,'' 98
Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 617 (1950). See cases cited in notes 6 and 10, supra.
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charitable regardless of the details of their structure or operation and the prevention of abuses of the privilege by organizations prima facie charitable which
actually serve some more ulterior purpose of their creators, is to be achieved.
Finally, it seems clear that the motive approach will remain the method employed by the courts despite the changes in the statutory treatment of charitable
corporations and foundations brought about by the Revenue Acts of 1950 and
1951,14 for the new provisions do not substantially affect the initial question
whether the corporation or foundation fulfills the basic requirements for exemption of section 101(6).

Patrick]. Ledwidge, S.Ed.

14 The general effect of these new provisions: (1) imposition of tax on "unrelated
business net income" of exempt organizations; (2) denial of exemption to otherwise exempt
organizations which engage in transactions with their creators or with the latter's associates
resulting in diversion of income or property of the organization to such creator or associate
on a preferential basis; (3) denial of exemption to otherwise exempt organizations which
unreasonably accumulate income. See I.R.C. §§421, 422, 423, 3813, 3814. The "umelated
income" aspect of these provisions alleviates the problem of "charities in business," whether
they conduct such business through a subsidiary corporation or otherwise. But the prohibited transaction aspect is believed to add little to what was implied in the former law. In
either event, the initial inquiry into satisfaction of the requirements of I.R.C., §101(6)
remains. See Finkelstein, "Tax Exempt Charitable Corporations: Revenue Act of 1950,"
50 MxcH. L. REv. 427 (1952).

